THE RED THREAD · MONKEY WEAVER

THE VALUE PROPOSITION, MADE ARITHMETIC

How a niche B2B SaaS stopped selling features and let its buyers price the problem themselves, and what that did to the first sales call.

A CASE STUDY · LAYERS, AGTECH SAAS · FOUR LEVERS, ONE INSTRUMENT

THE ARGUMENT, IN ONE PAGE

A PRODUCT CANNOT BE BOUGHT UNTIL THE BUYER CAN PRICE IT

LAYERS sold satellite yield prediction to sugar mills. The product worked. The problem was that its value lived in the language of the people who built it, and mills do not buy resolution, models or per parcel accuracy. They buy tons, days, and dollars per hectare.

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01 **The translation was built as a chain, not a message.** Every feature was carried through four steps: the operation it changes, the KPI the industry already watches, the money that KPI moves, and what standing still costs. A slogan cannot survive a committee. A chain can.

02 **Four levers, not fourteen.** The product does many things. Only four of them move money in ways a mill already measures, so only four became levers. Everything else stayed in the product documentation, where it belongs.

03 **The argument was turned into an instrument.** The chain became a public calculator. The buyer sets their own crop, hectares, yield and reference price, and reads the value at stake in their own numbers. A claim made by the vendor became arithmetic done by the buyer.

04 **What changed was the conversation.** Qualification moved upstream, ahead of the first call. Conversion from qualified lead to sales conversation moved into the healthy band for B2B SaaS, and the discovery call stopped opening with a demonstration.

01

THE CONDITION

SELLING A GOOD PRODUCT TO A MARKET THAT CANNOT PRICE IT

A niche SaaS usually has the opposite of a quality problem. The technology is real, the team is credible, and the demo lands. What it lacks is a shared unit of measurement with the person signing.

LAYERS predicts, per parcel and per week, how much a field will produce before harvest. Stated that way, the sentence is precise and nearly useless commercially, because it describes what the company does rather than what the mill gets. A production manager does not have a budget line for accuracy. He has one for logistics, for labour, for the processing days lost when supply and demand fall out of step.

The gap shows up in the first sales call. When value has not been translated in advance, the call is spent teaching: this is the model, this is why satellite monitoring is not the same as a forecast, this is what per parcel means. Teaching is expensive. It consumes the only meeting where a buyer is genuinely attentive, and it puts the vendor in the role of explaining rather than the buyer in the role of calculating.

The company had already named the underlying problem well, and publicly. Estimation is not prediction. What was missing was the second half of that sentence: what the difference is worth, in the currency the buyer already keeps books in.

EXHIBIT 1 · THE PROBLEM, STATED IN THE PRODUCT'S OWN WORDS

THE PROBLEM

Estimation is not prediction

Every harvest, the same pattern:

> You plan logistics with your field team's best estimate.
>
> Reality arrives and the deviation is 10%, 15%, sometimes more.
>
> Equipment idle waiting for grain that didn't come. Or production bottlenecked because volume exceeded capacity.
>
> The CFO asks: "why were the numbers wrong?"

On a 10,000 ha operation with average yield of 75 t/ha and commodity price at USD 400/ton:

in uncaptured value for every 1% of error in your yield estimate. **USD $405,000**

UNCAPTURED VALUE PER ESTIMATION ERROR



Base: 10,000 ha sugarcane operation, 75 TCH, USD 400/ton. Adjust for your crop and market.

Your team isn't the problem. Your tools are. Field experience, historical averages, and vigor maps were built for a stable climate. Seasons are no longer stable. The gap between estimating and predicting is where value disappears.

Public page, layerscrop.com. A precise statement of the problem, still expressed in the vocabulary of the people who built the product.

02

THE INSTRUMENT, PART ONE

FOUR LEVERS, AND THE CHAIN THAT MAKES THEM COUNTABLE

The framework begins by refusing to be comprehensive. The product does many things well; only four of them move money in a way a mill already measures. Those four became the levers, and everything else was left out of the commercial argument on purpose. A list of fourteen capabilities is a list a committee cannot act on.

Each lever is then carried through the same four steps, in the same order, and the order is the whole point.

FEATURE	Weekly per parcel yield projections, in tons per hectare. **What the product does.**
OPERATIONAL LEVER	Harvest scheduling, transport logistics and labour align with what the field will actually deliver. **What changes on Monday.**
INDUSTRY KPIS	Estimated against actual production deviation. Processing days lost to supply and demand mismatch. Logistics cost per ton. **Metrics the buyer already reports.**
FINANCIAL IMPACT	The value recovered by a one per cent improvement in the yield estimate, at their scale. **The money.**
COST OF INACTION	What an operation running at plus or minus fifteen per cent estimation error leaves on the table every season. **The price of the status quo.**

Two decisions inside that chain do most of the work. The first is that the KPIs are not invented for the occasion: they are the ones the industry already watches, so the buyer does not have to accept a new way of measuring before accepting the product. The second is the last step. Value framed only as gain is optional, and optional purchases lose to the budget cycle. Value framed as money already being lost turns a nice to have into a decision with a date on it.

EXHIBIT 2 · ONE LEVER, CARRIED THROUGH THE FULL CHAIN



Public page, layerscrop.com. The four levers sit across the top; selecting one opens the chain beneath it. The structure of the page is the framework itself.

03

THE INSTRUMENT, PART TWO

FROM AN ARGUMENT THE VENDOR MAKES TO ARITHMETIC THE BUYER DOES

A chain of reasoning printed on a page is still the vendor's claim. The buyer reads it, grants that it is coherent, and files it with every other vendor's coherent claim. Nothing has been transferred.

The last step of the framework is therefore not a document but an instrument. The same chain was published as a calculator: the visitor chooses the crop, sets the hectares, sets the average yield, sets the reference price they actually sell at, and the page answers with the value at stake in those numbers.

Three things happen at once when a buyer moves those sliders. The abstraction becomes personal, because the figure on screen is derived from their own operation and not from a reference customer. The vendor stops being the source of the number, which removes the reflex to discount it. And the buyer performs the calculation themselves, which is the difference between being told something and concluding it.

The instrument is also honest about its own limits, which is what keeps it credible. It states that the figures are conservative and that the real impact is shown against the client's historical data in a technical demo. That sentence does more selling than an inflated multiple would: it invites the meeting instead of promising the outcome.

Seen from marketing, this is nurturing in its applied form. Most nurturing sends material and hopes attention accumulates. This asks the buyer to enter their own reality and shows them, in one screen, where their needle would move.

EXHIBIT 3 · THE CHAIN, MADE OPERABLE



Public page, layerscrop.com. Inputs on the left are the buyer's own operation. The panel on the right is the answer in their currency, with the conservative caveat kept visible.

04

THE EFFECT

WHAT CHANGED WAS THE CONVERSATION, NOT THE CONVERSION RATE

Before, the funnel was wide and thin. Fifty interested visitors produced roughly ten conversations worth having, and those conversations opened with a demonstration: what the product is, how the model works, why satellite data is not the same as a yield forecast. The first call was spent teaching.

After, the qualification happens before anyone picks up. A visitor who has set their own hectares, their own yield and their own reference price arrives having already done the arithmetic. The call starts where it used to end. Conversion from qualified lead to sales conversation moved into the healthy band for B2B SaaS.

The honest part, and the part most case studies leave out: fewer things now count as a qualified lead than before, because the instrument filters out curiosity. That is what it is for. It is also why the volume of qualified leads is not the metric that improved. What improved is that a sales conversation now begins with a buyer who has already priced the problem.

> He created a recurring lead generation process, which was the main goal behind every other project we had.
>
> XAVIER SILVA · CEO, HEMAV TECHNOLOGY

A note on measurement. The figures above are described in orders of magnitude rather than as reported metrics, and the band referred to is the published benchmark for B2B SaaS, where healthy conversion from marketing qualified lead to sales qualified lead is commonly placed between twenty five and forty per cent, with best in class above sixty. Internal pipeline figures belong to the company that owns them and are not reproduced here.

05

THE TRANSFER

HOW THE SAME SYSTEM IS INSTALLED IN ANOTHER PRODUCT

Nothing in this case depends on agriculture. It depends on a buyer who measures their business in units the vendor is not yet using. Five steps move any niche product onto those units.

01 FIND THE LEDGER THE BUYER ALREADY KEEPS

Not the metrics you would like them to track. The ones already in their monthly report, defended in front of their own board. Value expressed in a new unit of measurement has to win two arguments instead of one.

02 CUT THE CAPABILITY LIST DOWN TO WHAT MOVES THAT LEDGER

Most products have three to five real levers and a long tail of features that support them. The tail belongs in documentation, not in the commercial argument. A committee cannot act on fourteen reasons.

03 CARRY EVERY LEVER THROUGH THE WHOLE CHAIN

Feature, operational change, industry KPI, money, and cost of inaction. Stopping at the operational change is the common failure: it produces a benefit statement that reads well and cannot be budgeted.

04 PUBLISH THE ARITHMETIC INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION

Give the buyer the inputs and let the number be theirs. An instrument they can operate transfers conviction in a way a claim they must accept never does, and it disqualifies the merely curious at no cost to you.

05 KEEP THE CAVEAT VISIBLE

State that the model is conservative and that the real figure is established with their own data. The restraint is what makes the rest believable, and it converts the instrument into an invitation rather than a promise.

The work of building this is mostly judgment: which levers, which KPIs, which hypotheses of return are worth defending in front of a buyer who knows the sector better than you do. That part cannot be delegated to a machine. What a machine can do, once the judgment exists, is turn it into a working public instrument in a fraction of the time the same job used to take by hand, which is the only reason a marketing function of one could ship it at all.

THE RED THREAD

YOUR VALUE IS INVISIBLE UNTIL SOMEONE NAMES IT.

If your product is strong and your pipeline is thin, the gap is usually a unit of measurement, not a message.

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